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Collaborative Network Security in Multi-Tenant Data Center for
Cloud Computing
Zhen Chen , Wenyu Dong, Hang Li, Peng Zhang, Xinming Chen, and Junwei Cao
Abstract: A data center is an infrastructure that supports Internet service. Cloud computing is rapidly changing
the face of the Internet service infrastructure, enabling even small organizations to quickly build Web and mobile
applications for millions of users by taking advantage of the scale and flexibility of shared physical infrastructures
provided by cloud computing. In this scenario, multiple tenants save their data and applications in shared data
centers, blurring the network boundaries between each tenant in the cloud. In addition, different tenants have
different security requirements, while different security policies are necessary for different tenants. Network
virtualization is used to meet a diverse set of tenant-specific requirements with the underlying physical network,
enabling multi-tenant datacenters to automatically address a large and diverse set of tenants requirements. In this
paper, we propose the system implementation of vCNSMS, a collaborative network security prototype system used
in a multi-tenant data center. We demonstrate vCNSMS with a centralized collaborative scheme and deep packet
inspection with an open source UTM system. A security level based protection policy is proposed for simplifying
the security rule management for vCNSMS. Different security levels have different packet inspection schemes and
are enforced with different security plugins. A smart packet verdict scheme is also integrated into vCNSMS for
intelligence flow processing to protect from possible network attacks inside a data center network.
Key words: data center network; network security; software defined network; collaborative network security; multitenant; network virtualization; intelligent flow processing; cloud computing
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Introduction

A cloud data center is an infrastructure that supports
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Internet services. A cloud data center may be defined
from a variety of perspectives, and the most popular
ones are categorized by IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS proposed
by the NIST[1] and include public cloud, private cloud,
hybrid cloud, and other different categories. Other
categories include computing, networking, storage
from a system’s perspective or using (in use), archiving
(at rest), and transmission (in motion) from a data
perspective. Specific to the cloud network, there are
different characteristics of a cloud (remote access),
within a cloud, and between cloud networks. The
debut of VMware NSX provides the virtualization
of networks with Software-Defined Network (SDN)
inside a data center. The Google B4 network[2] also
uses an OpenFlow-based SDN[3, 4] to implement all the
interconnections among cloud data centers in different
locations.
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The challenge posed by SDN is the dynamic
characteristic of network boundaries that is the “twin”
of the network topology with expanded flexibility
provided by virtualization. In other words, the original
static, natural, and physical boundaries within the
traditional network are replaced by the dynamic and
virtual logical boundaries of SDN.
1.1

State-of-the-art network security in data center
networks

Traditional security devices such as Firewalls, IDS,
WAF, and other devices are deployed with the
Middleboxes model inside and outside networks. With
the development of cloud computing technology, the
deployment of Middleboxes is facing new challenges
in the large-scale data center network environment[5] .
(1) In multi-tenant cases, the network boundaries
are blurring.
With the increase of Internet users, the data center
network topology becomes more complicated. Multiple
tenants save their data in the same server, and the
same tenant may store data on different servers
with multiple hot backups, causing the network
boundaries between each user to become blurred, as
opposed to the set boundaries found in traditional
physical isolation. The original static, natural, and
physical boundaries within the network are replaced
by dynamic and virtual logical boundaries. Hence,
network security within the cloud will be more
dependent on dynamic deployment, configuration,
and management of security policies and security
components, and more dependent on the network
security system for flow and traffic awareness, decisionmaking, and response. Undoubtedly, this causes
network management to become more complex. How
to ensure network security is a challenge in such a
complex network environment.
(2) The deployment location of Middleboxes also
has new changes.
In traditional networks, the data of several hosts are
from the same gateway, and the entire network may
have several gateways. So long as security devices
are deployed in network vantage points and ensure
data through the gateway is safe and reliable. In the
data center network, the physical vantage points have
been replaced by virtual logical gateways. To protect
the security of virtual logical boundaries between
tenants, Firewall, IDS/IPS, and other devices are
required to collaborate with the traffic controller to
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adapt to performance and safety requirements of each
tenant or security domain, provide security of dynamic
boundaries caused by virtual machine migration, and
meet the dynamic security requirements of virtual
machines[6-10] . Therefore, to meet these requirements,
how to properly deploy these security devices is also an
important issue.
(3) Security requirements for different tenants are
different.
Since different tenants have different security
requirements, it is necessary to create different security
policies for different tenants, and this is undoubtedly
a major challenge for traditional security devices. The
traditional approach is to set rules for the device
where data passed through. Obviously, in a data center
network, this strategy no longer applies, and now we
have to address the question how to meet diverse
security requirements when multiple tenants’ data pass
through the same security device and how to provide
effective enforcement.
(4) The migration of the virtual machine results in
the switchover of security domain.
To meet the security needs of a single tenant, it needs
to configure multiple security devices to control traffic
and thus completely implement the tenant’s security
policy. When service host migrates to other locations
in the network, the topology of the network changes
and appropriate security policies also migrate with the
tenant host. The original security configuration of the
security device will no longer work, the migration to
the new security domain also requires tenants on that
server to apply some configuration updates. Therefore,
to protect the mapping of the security policies from the
logical network to the physical network and maintain its
correctness and consistency will be a major challenge to
the control function of a data center network.
1.2

Software-defined network in data center
network

To enable network virtualization, SDN is one of the
supporting technologies to build cloud data center
virtual networks. Cloud data center virtual networks
need to ensure tenants’ security domains have complete
and isolated network boundaries. This is not a
simple network security technology, because the virtual
network itself provides services for multiple tenants
or basic virtual private cloud services that should be
guaranteed in the implementation of the network. Due
to the different virtual machines of different tenants
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sharing the same physical resources, system security
guarantees such as preventing the virtual machine from
escaping its boundaries are also the issue of network
virtualization security.
Comparing software-defined network security (e.g.,
OpenFlow based on SDN) with a traditional physical
network, the changes are in the control mechanisms of
switches, routers, and other forwarding devices. The
forwarding devices worked according to a flow table
issued by the controller, thereby more efficient and
less costly. The controller also collects network status
information, discovers network topologies, checks the
network forwarding policies, and generates and releases
new flow table according to status update.
Thus, handling of the first network packets header
of a flow should not happen in the gateway, but in the
controller. The traditional Access Control List (ACL)
scheme or network packet filtering Firewall should
be deployed in the controller. However, the controller
usually only receives the first packet header and cannot
perform an deep inspection of the network flows. The
stateful Firewalls and deep packet inspection that filter
packet payloads should be deployed in the data plane
or in the data plane and control plane. Therefore,
the network access control deployed on the physical
network gateway should still be reasonable for a logical
gateway.
Through Openflow protocols and controllers, data
center network security based on SDN addresses the
problems of Middleboxes positioning and separation of
security rules by setting a flow table and guiding traffic
that matches the corresponding policies to the proper
security devices.
It is possible to optimize the controller by
configuration and management, and update rules for
dynamic migration and reconfiguration to solve security
policy inconsistencies caused by Middlebox movement
and virtual machine migration.

2
2.1

Related Work
Network security in data center networks

Among the security research in data center networks,
SDN security is a hot topic both for academia and
industry.
FRESCO[11-13] introduces a new security application
development framework. It is used to solve several key
issues when implementing security service components
on demand. OpenFlow is an open standard that is able

to provide simplified and convenient design of complex
network security applications and their integration
into large networks. However, so far there remains a
lack of convincing applications regarding the security
aspects of OpenFlow. FRESCO provides a scripting
language Application Programming Interface (API) that
programmer can use to write security monitoring logic
with a modular library of basic processing unit in
FRESCO. A FRESCO module allows customization of
stream processing rules to provide an effective response
to detected networks threats.
Slick[14] is a proposed programming framework that
separates the controller and Middleboxes and provides
an interface for communication. There are more and
more programs running on controllers which cross data
planes and control planes to call actions, and there is
no complete solution to meet this requirement. While
OpenFlow provides a programmable control plane,
it has a relatively simple data plane. In contrast,
Middleboxes are able to effectively extend the data
plane and provide a complex data plane, but cannot
provide effective integration with the control plane.
Slick extends data plane programmability in two
aspects. First, Slick arranges complex data plane
functions dynamically in the network, and also guides
a subset of packet through the appropriate function
processing queue that adapts to the position of the
layout and response as these change over time to meet
the changeable network conditions and transmission
mode. Second, to achieve modularity, reusability,
and integration strategy across multiple applications
and network resources, Slick allows programmers to
coordinate multiple actions among different entities in
the data plane.
SIMPLE, based on SDN, is proposed in Refs. [1518], and is an implementation of strategy layer
that directs traffic to specific Middleboxes. Today’s
networks must rely on Middleboxes to provide high
throughput, high security, and efficient decisionprocessing capabilities. To achieve these goals, we
need to ensure that traffic goes directly to the required
Middleboxes queue, an operation that once requires
extensive manual effort and operator’s expertise. In this
respect, an SDN provides a promising option, but also
introduces some functions that do not belong to the
traditional L2/L3 functions, such as policy components,
resource management, and packet manipulation.
SIMPLE allows network operators to specify routing
policies in a logical Middlebox, and automatically
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update forwarding rules according to the physical
topologies, switching capacity, and resource constraints
of Middleboxes to guide traffic to the proper
Middleboxes queues. Under the premise of existing
SDN functions and without modifying the existing
implementation of Middleboxes, SIMPLE increases
the flexibility of Middleboxes deployment effectively
by flow oriented control, and also generates and
loads new rules to maintain network stability when
any Middleboxes fail and/or network transmission is
overloaded.
2.2

Network virtualization with VMware NSX

VMware NSX[19] is a network virtualization platform
for data center networks. VMware NSX provides a
network management and network security system for
its software-defined data center that combines SDN
and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV), and is
designed to achieve the rapid deployment of multiple
layers of a logical network without complicated
configuration of physical devices that greatly improves
the flexibility of network deployment. It provides 27 layers’ NFV and provides a software-based security
model to achieve the decoupling of the underlying
network hardware, thus making full use of the existing
network infrastructure.
The core components of VMware NSX are logic
switches, logical routers, NSX APIs, logical Firewalls,
logical load balancing, logical VPN, etc. NSX provides
a network virtualization approach that allows data
center operators to treat the physical network as an ondemand system and capacity tool. The overall structure
of NSX is shown in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1

Network virtualization platform of VMware NSX[19] .
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The scalability in NSX provides services of other
network security vendors. The NSX platform uses
a distributed service framework that allows multiple
hosts to integrate the network service, and can easily
insert new service modules using the NSX API. NSX
offers a variety of logical device interfaces, but it also
needs cooperation from other vendors to achieve correct
mapping of logical-to-physical connections when faced
with a wide variety of hardware devices.
2.3

NSX and network security

NSX aims to integrate security functions offered by
other vendors. To simplify the third-party security
products and integrate services, authorized vendors use
a single specific API that links the security platform
and the network. NSX’s Service Composer tool is
used to deploy third-party Firewalls, anti-malwares,
vulnerability management, data loss protection,
intrusion detection, and intrusion prevention (IDS/
IPS) platforms centrally.
In addition to the security measures discussed above,
the network service gateways bridge the physical and
virtual environments, and application delivery services
include load balancing, application delivery, and WAN
optimization.
There are internal stateful Firewalls in the NSX
that can provide distributed Firewall detection for each
virtual router port. Firewall management uses a variety
of rules, audit, and inspection technologies. It also
provides the logic state, and integrates routing into a
third-party security platform.
Brocade VCS Gateway allows the connection of
virtual and physical facilities while providing the types
of applications required by a data center operator
to maintain a unified network. By using Brocade
VCS Fabric technology, one can use their current
infrastructure to implement network management
deployment. The implementation structure of Brocade
VCS Gateway is shown in Fig. 2.
Cumulus Linux system provides programmable
features and automated tools that use the same
computing environment on network devices to quickly
configure the physical network and increase costefficiency when adding new network capacity by
reducing the difficulty of adding new devices. It
provides support for network virtualization boundary
functions by realizing coverage of the second layer
gateway and avoiding use of the virtual network
of the VXLAN tunnel endpoint, and registers NSX
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Fig. 2

Brocade supported NSX switch gateway[19] .

gateway services to further simplify management by
the controller. Combined with NSX, Cumulus Linux
provides a network virtualization boundary to achieve
physical workload at high levels of connectivity. The
integrated solution of Cumuluss NSX is shown in Fig. 3.
Dell S6000 data center switching gateway for NSX
provides programmability, automation features, and
scalability. S6000 is a high-performance gateway for
NSX that extends a virtual network to the physical
server, or connects the physical workload that is
accessed by virtual LANs to the logical network via
the second layer network services, also provides the
migration from an existing virtual environment to the
public cloud, creates a hybrid cloud, etc. The specific
structure of the S6000 data center switching gateway
for NSX is shown in Fig. 4.
In addition, for the security of the data center,
Palo Alto presents its next generation security
platform[20, 21] . As shown in Fig. 5, its core component
is a powerful Firewall that provides identification and
control functions, and is always able to detect threats
while ensuring the safe operation of the program. Palo
Alto PA-5000 offers a variety of defense options to
network threats, such as IPS and anti-malware software
to defeat known threats, and automated sandbox
analysis of suspicious files to detect unknown malicious
programs or APT attacks.

Fig. 4 The integration of Dell S6000 switching gateway and
NSX[19] .

Fig. 5

3

vCNSMS

In this section, we propose vCNSMS, a collaborative
network management prototype system derived
from CNSMS[22-26] for multi-tenant data center
networks. In our experiments, we demonstrate that
vCNSMS can be integrated into virtualized cloud
environments. vCNSMS is a prototype system with
a home-brewed version of an untangle open source
multifunction gateway[27, 28] .
3.1
3.1.1

Fig. 3

The integrated structure of Cumuluss Linux NSX[19] .

The integration of the Palo Alto network and NSX[19] .

The principle of collaborative network security
in DCN
Basic network topology

The Security Center and peer-UTM are deployed in the
data center network. In the bootstrap stages, the peerUTM is running a registration process for the Security
Center.
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The Security Center receives the registration
information and displays the registered UTMs. Figure 6
shows the vCNSMS configuration and the registration
process in the bootstrap stage.
3.1.2

Collaborative security in DCN

3.1.2.1 Security center interacts with the peer-UTMs
We assume each peer-UTM manages a virtual domain
for a tenant in the Data Center, and the peerUTM is managed by commands from the Security
Center. Figures 7 and 8 show the collaborative network
security process in vCNSMS prototype.
(1) Security Center issues rules: There is a help
option for rule creation and an option for the rule issued,
in web User Interface (UI).
(2) Peer-UTM reports events: The Security Center

needs a web interface to display the security events
reported by peer-UTMs.
(3) Events inform between peer-UTMs: There is a
web-based UI in the peer-UTM collaborative security
module. The web UI shows the different peer-UTMs to
the Security Center and displays any occured security
events.
3.1.2.2 Antivirus module in collaborative security
Workflow of Antivirus module is shown in Fig. 9.

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig. 6 vCNSMS configuration settings and registration
process in the bootstrap stage.
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Security rules issued.

Security rules interwork.

Fig. 9 Workflow of signature database updating in
Antivirus module.
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(1) The Security Center imports the virus signature
database: There is an option to import the virus
signature database in the Security Center.
(2) The Security Center issues the virus signature
database: There is an option to issue the virus signature
database in the Security Center.
(3) An interface displays that the virus database has
been updated: The time changes.
(4) Virus signature database synchronization between
peer-UTMs is performed using the p2p mode.
3.1.2.3 Firewall module in collaborative security
Workflow of Firewall module is shown in Fig. 10.
(1) Importing Firewall rules to Security Center: The
option of importing Firewall rules to the Security
Center.
(2) Security Center issues the Firewall rules: The
option of issuing the Firewall rules.
(3) Interface displays that the Firewall rules have
been updated: There is a web UI in the peer-UTM
collaborative security Firewall module. The web UI
shows the new Firewall rules that will be updated.
(4) The peer-UTMs choose to implement the rules
that are updated by the Security Center: In the display
UI of the update rules, the peer-UTMs are allowed to let
a certain rule lapse if that rule is not applicable.
3.1.2.4 Protocol control and content matching
module in collaborative security
Functions and principles are the same as Section
3.1.2.3.
3.1.3

Security rule center

and client, and the server program is a socket
communication module written in Java that is manually
activated in the Security Center. The client program is
running in the peer-UTM Firewall and Rules control
module. When the server and client programms are
running normally, the Security Center can quickly
transfer rules in a specific folder to the peer-UTM’s rule
control module.
The event alarm module is a web application based on
Apache Tomcat that opens port 443 for this service. It
listens for any security event reported from the peerUTM, and dynamically displays these on the web UI.
The rule format for the Security Center and peerUTM communication mechanism is shown in Appendix
A, in details.
3.1.4

Virtualization network based on SDN

An experimental platform based on Openflow SDN is
shown in Fig. 11, and the detailed configuration is
shown in Table 1. Network topology and the host IPs
are allocated in the following 2 rules:
(1) Each virtual machine is bridged to eth0
(192.168.0.0) segment for easy ssh control.
(2) Another controller is also present in this section
and controls Openflow switch communication.
In the Openflow switch, there are three Ethernet
ports that can be connected according to experimental
needs. Each client has an Ethernet port that can
be connected to any Openflow switch according
to experimental needs. We use Openflow in the
experimental environment. Here are some details of the

The security rule center in security center runs on
Debian Linux, and includes a rule distribution module
and an event alarm module.
The rule distribution module is divided into server

Fig. 10

Workflow of rules issuing to Firewall module.

Fig. 11

Virtualization network based on SDN.
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Detailed configuration settings in virtualization network based on SDN.

VMs

IP

Hostname

Host alias

System

Controller

192.168.0.60

Saturn-controller

Control

Ubuntu 13.10 (flood light)

OpenFlow1

192.68.0.61

Saturn-openFlow1

Of1

Ubuntu 13.04

OpenFlow2

192.68.0.62

Saturn-openFlow2

Of2

Ubuntu 13.04

OpenFlow3

192.68.0.63

Saturn-openFlow3

Of3

Ubuntu 13.04

Client1

192.68.0.64

Client1

Client1

Ubuntu 13.04

Client2

192.68.0.65

Client2

Client2

Ubuntu 13.04

set up deployment.
(1) In Openflow 1.0, there is only a single userspace
datapath. The dpct that played an important role
in previous versions is replaced by ofdatapath and
ofprotocol.
(2) Ofdatapath is the implementation of a datapath. It
is responsible for forwarding packets based on the
flow table and communicates through ofprotocol and
floodlight.
(3) Ofprotocol is a middle program that controls
ofdatapath and is controlled by floodlight.
(4) dpctl can still be used to view the flow table in
the Openflow switch, but cannot be used to manage the
datapath.
(5) To change the behavior of the Openflow switch,
the component (C or python) must pass through
floodlight, and the component will be loaded with
floodlight. (Specific usage can be referred to from the
main page for ofdatapath, ofprotocol, and dpctl).

3.2.2

3.2

(1) Update Firewall rules. The administrator puts a
new Firewall rule file in the specified folder named
FirewallRule in the Security Center. The daemon
program periodically checks this folder, and if there
is a new set of rules in the folder, the Security Center
will send announcement messages to all online peerUTMs to inform them of a new rule update. A peerUTM receives messages from the Security Center and
compares these with its own rules’ serial number in
the rule database. If there is an update, the peer-UTM
will send a download request to the Security Center
for the updated rules. The corresponding rules are then
downloaded to the local rule database and are activated
in real time.
(2) Firewall module blocks a specified network
flow. The Firewall module provides a blocking function
of rules based on “quintuple” filtering, and sends the
corresponding log info to the Security Center through
an announcement message too. After receiving the
message, the web UI of Security Center will present this

3.2.1

Deep security check in vCNSMS
Function settings

The Security Center, centrally manages security rules,
collects the feedback information from the rule
deployment, and stores the data into the security log.
(1) Security rules are incrementally downloaded. In
the Security Center, duplicate rules are removed from
the new rule set and make the new rules available. The
new rules will be added in a package and issued to the
peer-UTMs.
(2) Firewall module. Firewall rules will be
downloaded from the Security Center and loaded in the
Firewall module, and the corresponding functions will
be activated. Security events are collected and returned
back to the Security Center.
(3) UDP content filtering module. It blocks or drops
the specified types of data packets under the current
rules. The format for UDP rules and content matching
is presented in Appendix A.

Enhanced security functions

Protocol Control module in the prototype system
mainly enforces UDP protocol rules.
(1) UTMs routinely update rules. UTMs regularly
obtain Firewall rules. The configuration information
includes the rules of content inspection for UDP and
the blacklist based on the content filtering (source and
destination addresses, ports, protocol, URL).
(2) Filtering based on the content of a UDP
packet. According to the rules, any packets that contain
specified signatures will be matched. For example, the
DNS requests’ packets that contain the specified text
string “abc” will be matched and logged.
(3) Blocking function with a blacklist. Block
rule based on “quintuple” filtering, e.g., block the
network connection with a command such as “TCP
1.2.3.4:443”. The Firewall module can quickly apply
the update rule.
3.2.3

Implementation in peer-UTM
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information in real-time.
(3) UDP content filtering. UDP content filtering
module uses the same mechanism as the Firewall
module, and has the specified tag indicated in the
announcement message. When a peer-UTM receives
the announcement from the Security Center, it will send
a download request message to the Security Center for
the rules. When the rules are downloaded and activated,
the peer-UTM will call the getPatterns function in the
LoadPatterns class to activate the rules loaded in UDP
content filtering module. (We modify the prototype
system to load multiple UDP rules.) When the UDP
packet is parsed, the findMatch() function in the
EventHandler class will be called to match the content
and rules. The createRegExPattern function in the
PatternFactory class is called to process the content of
the UDP packet. The JAVA regular expression matching
and matcher functions in the java.util.regex class are
then used to match the rules and filter out any specified
content. Finally, the UDP packets that contain specified
content will be dropped.
3.3

Intelligent flow processing in vCNSMS

Intelligent flow processing is an advanced method
in Refs. [29-31] for intrusion detection. Intelligent
flow processing in vCNSMS is based on the smart
packet verdict scheme. In this section, we propose the
security level based protection policy for intelligent
flow processing in vCNSMS.
3.3.1

Security level based protection policy

The security level based protection policy is shown as
follows:
(1) Security level: Red, Yellow, Orange, and Green.
(2) Intelligence flow processing: According to the
security level, different security rule sets and packet
verdict schemes are used with different performances
and load costs.
(3) Multi-function security gateway: UTM can
configure different security plugins on the demand of
different security levels, and incurs different processing
costs. The working mode of peer-UTMs can also
be categorized into Red, Yellow, Orange, and Green
configurations.
3.3.2

Implementation of security
security function plugins

level

(1) Security plugins’ rule set: S1 (urgent), S2
(important), S3 (less important), and S4 (trivial).
(2) Security plugin module: plugin 1, plugin 2, plugin
3,    , plugin N.
(3) Security plugin module’s processing: Tagging
each packet with a Block mark, Pass mark, or Suspect
mark.
(4) Packet verdict on network packets is based on a
scoring system.
(5) Packet processing obeys the following strategy:
 Let the benign flows pass as soon as possible;
 Recheck the suspected flow with additional rule sets
or security plugins;
 Provide a verdict on the packet with the context,
i.e., current level of security, such as Red or Green.
(6) Packet verdict processing also takes traffic load
and performance penalties into consideration.
3.3.2.1 Smart packet verdict scheme with untangle
Shield
Originally, Shield is an untangle module whose function
is to prevent DoS attacks. Shield reads a packet
from nfqueue and starts four threads including a
main thread, an event dispatch thread, an admission
packet processing thread, and a frontend microhttpd
daemon. The main task of Shield is to collect packet
processing threads, and there is no parallel structure
in Shield. Figure 12 shows the smart packet verdict
scheme used in vCNSMS.
3.3.2.2 Process level parallelization of Shield
We separate the untangle Shield module and enhance it
with our smart packet verdict scheme. For performance
improvement, we also modify Shield to integrate

with

We modify the untangle Shield module[27, 32] and
enhance it with the smart packet verdict algorithm. The
detailed functions are as follows.

Fig. 12

Smart packet verdict scheme used in vCNSMS.
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xtables[33] for parallelization.
The Shield test environment is shown in Fig. 13. The
parallelization scheme of Shield may be accomplished
in two ways:
(1) Use multiple NFQUEUEs and open multiple
Shield processes that perform the same as the
Snort inline program[34] .
(2) Rewrite the Shield code to implement a dispatcher
for the corresponding queue in the program to achieve
multi-threaded processing.
The detailed parallelization scheme is given as
follows:
(1) Install xtables-addons-1.12-nslab that is an
NFQUEUEX module with the shunt function.
(2) Specify iptables -A FORWARD -j NFQUEUEX
–queue-num 4. The last parameter establishes four
NFQUEUEs in this example.
(3) Start four Shield processes, with different queue
numbers and port numbers assigned to each.
To achieve the forward operation, it needs not only to
set routing table of client1 and client2, but also to run
the command (echo1>/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip forward) to
enable the kernel forwarding function.
3.3.2.3 Performance of Shield parallelization
Because of the amount of traffic is throttled from
a single IP, UDP packets sent by traffic generator
SmartBit will lead the original Shield to block these
packets. To avoid this, we modify Shield to make all
packets pass through. The performance measured in this
manner should reflect the capability of Shield module.
The test environment is described as follows:
(1) Hardware: Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Quad CPU
Q9400 @ 2.66 GHz, 4 cores, 2 GB memory, 8 Gbit
ports.
(2) Software: Ubuntu 13.04, Shield untangle module.

(3) SmartBit settings: 4-way UDP streams with
different IP and Ports. Packet loss ratio is collected in
each experiment. Each experiment is conducted in a 1Gbps link with varied input traffic ratio from 10% to
100%.
As shown in Fig. 14, five parallel Shield processes
can handle 400-500 Mbps. The CPU usage is about
40%. Memory consumption is quite low. As Shield
only deals with the headers of packets in this test, the
performance result is expectable, but it is slower than
the Snort[35] .
3.3.2.4 Bottleneck analysis of Shield
We use Intels VTune tools in the compile stage
of the Shield module. Running performance
evaluation experiments of the Shield module
produces useful information of the function calls
inside the Shield module. The most time consuming
operations in packet handling are concentrated in
barfight net nfqueue read() and
handle packet()
wherein the packet verdict scheme is running. In
addition, the debug function is time consuming.
As we run the Shield module in a virtual machine,
performance issue in virtualized environments is a
critical and open problem, which has already been
discussed in Ref. [36]. We can further improve
performance with vPF ring[37] in virtualized
environments.

Fig. 13 Performance evaluation in Shield parallelization
implementation.

Fig. 14 Throughput for smart packet verdict scheme in
vCNSMS.

4

Conclusions

In this paper, we propose vCNSMS to address
network security in multiple-tenants data center and
demonstrate vCNSMS with a centralized collaborative
scheme. vCNSMS can further integrate a smart
packet verdict scheme for packet inspection to defend
from possible network attacks inside the data center
network. An SDN-based virtualization network in a
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data center can deploy vCNSMS for flexibility and
scalability to protect multiple tenants with different
network policies and security requirements. The smart
packet verdict scheme can be further investigated and
improved with parallelization.

5

Future Work

Based on the practical deployment and operational
experience gained from evaluating vCNSMS in a data
center network, vCNSMSs security center is able
to deploy more and more security rules and collect
data of network events. It should be possible to
detect network policy violations and intrusion with an
artificial intelligence based on unsupervised learning
methods. This is a promising area for exploration in the
future.
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